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Patrides, Plotinus and the Cambridge Platonists​[1]​

The Errors of Patrides
Constantinos Patrides (1930-86) was an estimable scholar and teacher, whose volume of selections from ‘the Cambridge Platonists’ (1980) is probably the principal entry point for modern scholars beginning to investigate these neglected authors​[2]​. In that volume he identifies most of their references to Plotinus and other ancient authors, and does a good job explaining their – and Plotinus’s – fundamental beliefs. The volume, nonetheless, embodies a variety of errors – most of them not (as far as I know) about the Cambridge Platonists, but about Plotinus and his immediate followers.
The most notable error is not, in fact, about Plotinus at all, but represents the level of – often pardonable – negligence in reading ancient sources that I shall identify. Patrides quotes John Norris as referring to a ‘celebrated comment by St.Augustine’, that God occupied Himself before the making of the world in ‘preparing an Hell for the Inquisitive’, and provides the reference, to Augustine’s Confessions 11.12 that Norris had in mind (1980, 37). If Patrides (or Norris) had actually read the passage they would have discovered that this joke was not Augustine’s: he mentions it only to rebut it, with the traditional response that until the making of the world there was no time. The passage could be the starting point for several interesting discussions: notably, the sense in which we can speak without absurdity of what was or wasn’t ‘before’ time came to be, and a further enquiry into Augustine’s reasons for denigrating prurient or otherwise misplaced curiosity (which is not at issue here, but has wider implications). Patrides, however, merely notes the source of Norris’s comment without checking its real relevance.
A second significant error, of another sort, is represented in Patrides’ rebuke to Henry More (1980, 32) for ‘falling into belief in spiritualism, occultism, witchcraft’, in a manner, so Patrides says, ‘distressingly reminiscent of Iamblichus’ deviation from Neoplatonism through his practice of theurgy’ – a practice that he (1980, 4), describes as ‘manifestly un-Platonic’. Reports of apparitions, for Patrides, are simply ‘nonsense’, and More’s argument that to disbelieve on principle in witches is to disbelieve in spirits, and so at last in God Himself, is dismissed without due consideration. This ‘error’, as I am calling it, is not a mistake of the first sort – not a simple misreading, or failure to read, a text. It is rather a mistake of principle, an unexamined insistence that modern prejudices are so obviously correct that anyone who disagrees must plainly have ‘fallen’ into intellectual and probably ethical error. Patrides has not been alone in this: his judgement on Iamblichus, and other post-Plotinian theurgists, echoed standard, scornful condemnations by other scholars – who never seemed to need an actual argument for their disdain. More recent work has given Iamblichus and the rest far greater credit (for example, Shaw 1995), and might justly give Henry More (and Joseph Glanvill) some as well. I will not be examining a belief in witchcraft here – that would take me too far off course. But it is indeed very odd to insist so strongly that there cannot possibly be witches (that is, people who have sought the aid of devils to accomplish their designs) because there cannot possibly be devils (that is, spiritual beings with malevolent intentions towards humanity and the rest of God’s creation). Any naïve examination of history might on the contrary suggest that we have excellent empirical evidence for the existence of devils, and their pawns. The really interesting question is whether we have evidence of an organized opposition. 
Fairy tales are not responsible for producing in children fear, or any of the shapes of fear; fairy tales do not give the child the idea of the evil or the ugly; that is in the child already, because it is in the world already. Fairy tales do not give the child his first idea of bogey. What fairy tales give the child is his first clear idea of the possible defeat of bogey. The baby has known the dragon intimately ever since he had an imagination. What the fairy tale provides for him is a St. George to kill the dragon (Chesterton 1904, 102). 
This is not to say, of course, that witch trials have always or ever been fair, or remotely accurate. It does not seem that as many people were hanged or burnt as witches as modern folklore proposes, but no doubt very many were, and no doubt many or even most of them were innocent of any crime (see Hutton 1999). And many or most of those who would now claim the name of ‘witches’ are rather identifying with a sort of pagan revivalism than allying themselves with evil (see Luhrmann 1989). But it does not follow that More was wrong to think not only that there might in principle be witches, but that there actually were, any more than the many miscarriages of justice in our day can demonstrate that there are no terrorists or paedophiles or corrupt financiers, and that we shouldn’t even mention the possibility of such.
And a third error – or at any rate a third contentious claim – is to follow Joseph Glanvill in his critical description of Cudworth’s ‘plastic nature’ (a concept drawn explicitly from Plotinus) as a theory explaining ‘the unknown by asserting another quite hypothetical unknown’, or as a mere ‘fine word’ (Patrides 1980, 293n)​[3]​. Cudworth and Plotinus were addressing a real issue unexplained by the ‘mechanical philosophy’, and providing a metaphor drawn from our own experience of habitual action, in particular from the pantomimic dance (Patrides 1980, 306). ‘The activity of life is an artistic activity, like the way one who is dancing is moved’ (Plotinus Ennead III.2 [47].16, 23-5),​[4]​ without needing to think through each individual step, nor even having any future goal consciously before him. ‘The parts of the dancer’s body cannot possibly keep the same position in every figure: as his body follows the pattern of the dance and bends with it, one of his limbs is pressed hard down, another relaxed, one works hard and painfully, another is given a rest as the figuring changes. The dancer’s intention looks elsewhere; his limbs are affected in accordance with the dance and serve the dance and help to make it perfect and complete’ (Ennead IV.4 [28].33, 12-19). Nature, as Plotinus and Cudworth conceived her, is the last trace of Soul in the material or phenomenal world, ‘Art as it were Incorporated and Imbodied in matter’ (Patrides 1980, 301). This is a topic for another occasion.
These faults are symptomatic, principally of a failure to read the ancient or early modern texts with proper attention and intellectual humility. But what are the errors about Plotinus in particular that I am seeking to identify? They consist in the following assertions about the ways that the Cambridge Platonists differed from Plotinus:
1.	‘Plotinus as a pagan could assert that man achieves union with the Divine unaided, but the Christian Platonists as Christians regarded the candle of the Lord as a God-directed gift of God’ (Patrides 1980, 18).
2.	‘Plotinus’s reiterated counsel that a man should withdraw into himself is indeed echoed … but his further insistence on the necessity of man’s total isolation from the world was resisted at every turn’ (Patrides 1980, 18).
3.	John Smith in particular ‘was never prepared to maintain that [the flight of the Alone to the Alone] involves man’s translation into another region. It involves rather a transmutation into another state, the state wherein the soul is “inebriated with the delicious sense of the Divine Life”’ (Patrides 1980, 18).
4.	‘At no time is the soul [for the CPs] “out of Nature”, swallowed up and lost in the wide womb of the Divine’ (Patrides 1980, 18).
5.	‘Plotinus maintained free will but denied Grace’ (Patrides 1980, 22).
6.	‘As F.M.Cornford has rightly emphasised, there is not the “slightest warrant in Greek thought of the pre-Christian centuries for the notion of ‘overflowing love’, or love of any kind, prompting a god to make a world”’ (Patrides 1980, 169n, after Cornford 1935, 35).
These claims fall, roughly, into two divisions: the first, related to Plotinus’s supposed neglect of divine initiative; the second, to his supposed requirement that we withdraw entirely from this world to another. One further claim can be added to this second division – marked not entirely as an error but at least as a very misleading statement which Plotinus would have disputed on several different grounds:
7.	‘Our knowledge is intended only to qualify us for action, and lead us to it; and therefore the practice of virtue and a good life is the ultimate design of all study’ (Patrides 1980, 18, after Simplicius in Epictetum 76).
A third range of claims, not explicitly directed at a supposed divergence between the Cambridge Platonists and Plotinus, have rather to do with their supposed divergence from a post-Plotinian pattern that Patrides found objectionable:
8.	‘The shadow of St.Theresa or St.John of the Cross never fell upon them so as to divert their reason into paroxysms of love. They were never stifled by any “clouds of unknowing”, they were never tempted to traverse the “negative way”, and while they borrowed some of the Areopagite’s phrases they were never affected by his paradoxical ejaculations or his incandescent language’ (Patrides 1980, 17). The Areopagite, incidentally, is identified a little earlier (1980, 7-8) as easily dismissible along with the Hermetic Corpus once it was discovered that ‘his claim [sic] to have been the disciple of St Paul was altogether fraudulent’.
9.	‘No man should ever be invited to say with Anselm, credo ut intelligam, much less be demanded to silence his reason with that odd resolution of Tertullian’s, certum est quia impossibile’ (Patrides 1980, 10-11).
So why, as I suppose, did Patrides make so many and so serious errors? I must reemphasise that he was a serious and valuable scholar, far removed from the sort of glib dissection of other men’s philosophies that can be found in lesser works, and in the rants of the online commentariat. But I am inclined to suggest, as Plotinus did of Longinus, that he was ‘a scholar (philologos), but certainly not a philosopher (philosophos)’ (Porphyry Life of Plotinus 14.20).​[5]​ He did not, that is, seem awake to the possibility that Plotinus (and others) might mean things rather different than his own first readings of the words. Nor was he prepared to consider whether even very odd and unfamiliar theses might perhaps be right, or at least be reasoned hypotheses. The errors of course are not only his: too many commentators on Plotinus and on his successors have shared them, without ever – so it seems – seriously questioning the presuppositions that caused them to read the texts that way, or to find fault with the metaphysical and ethical theories that they thought they found there. This is not to say – implausibly – that there are no differences of method or opinion between the Cambridge Platonists and Plotinus: it is only to suggest that many supposed differences are unreal​[6]​.
What Plotinus Didn’t Say
But of course readers may not be immediately persuaded that any of Patrides’ claims are errors. Finally to prove that they are may possibly demand an entire revisioning of the Plotinian and other texts – on which enterprise many recent writers, including Kevin Corrigan, Sara Rappe, Pauliina Remes, Lloyd Gerson, Luc Brisson and of course Pierre Hadot, have been engaged.  What follows is rather a brief rebuttal of the specific claims I have identified in Patrides’ text.
Did Plotinus require us to withdraw entirely from the world of common day and moral action? Clearly he did not himself withdraw. He had served in the young emperor Gordian’s army and – most likely – accompanied that army, under Philip the Arab, back to Rome, where he established a philosophical salon in a respectable household, was on good terms with Senators and with the emperor Gallienus, proposed – with Gallienus’s approval – to establish a city on the model of Plato’s Laws, and acted as trustee for orphaned children. He did indeed approve of the senator Rogatianus’s abandoning his riches and his senatorial duties, but even Rogatianus did not vanish into a secret cave. Nor is it obvious that Senators in general did more good in the world than ordinary citizens. Plotinus drew examples and working metaphors from boxing, dancing, sculpture, medicine and sexual attraction. He vehemently rebuked ‘Gnostics’ (though the term is rather Porphyry’s than his) for professing to despise this world and its visible gods, and insisted that all souls and their visible forms should be dear to anyone who loved their Father: ‘anyone who feels affection for anything at all shows kindness to all that is akin to the object of his affection, and to the children of the father that he loves. But every soul is a child of That Father’ (Ennead II.9 [33].15 – 16.10).
The injunctions to dispose of everything superfluous, to go naked into the shrine (Ennead I.6 [1].7) to bring the divine in us back to the divine in the All, even the remark (as translated by John Smith) concerning the ‘flight of the Alone to the Alone’ (phuge monou pros monon: Ennead VI.9 [54].11, 51; see Smith on ‘the excellency and nobleness of true religion’ [Patrides 1980, 180]), are badly misread if we suppose him to be suggesting that each of us must needs be solitary or abandon our real present duties. That is not the point at all. ‘Monos’, constantly mistranslated ‘alone’ or ‘solitary’ or even ‘lonely’, means much the same as ‘gumnos’, naked: we are to strip ourselves, to be ‘pure’ as God is ‘pure’. And so far from this requiring a retreat within our solitary imagination it is the route back home to be together: the Fall, conversely, was when our souls grew tired of being together (Ennead IV.8 [6].4, 11f) and each went apart to our own would-be private world, bound up in our own sensations and self-regarding fantasies. It is the phenomenal world that divides us each from each, and it is in our intellectual grasp of the common reality that we can begin to come together. That grasp is more than a merely notional consent to the truisms we would mostly, verbally, acknowledge – that none of us is the sole centre of the world, that other creatures’ pains and pleasures are as real as ours, that the world existed long before our mortal eyes were opened and will endure when we are dead. A real assent, a real noetic recognition of reality and of enduring beauty, awakens intellect in love, drunk with beauty (Ennead VI.7 [38].35). So far from this being a derogation of ‘reason’ it is the very heart and purpose of all reasoning. Experiencing that Reality we no longer act from fear, whether of physical harm or of a bad reputation, but from a love that recognizes the real in every creature, even those not to our own immediate, parochial, taste. ‘Reason’ is not elevated merely as a means to physical or social achievement, whether individual or collective: as Plotinus remarks, non-rational creatures plainly manage very well without ratiocination (Ennead I.4 [46].2, 35-43). ‘Reason’ is to be valued as the recognition of reality, of beauty, and our reminder of our own identity ‘There’ in the real world. ‘Moral’ action, it is true, is not of the essence here: indeed all such action depends on there being evils to endure or remedy that the truly saintly would not wish to be, ‘as if a physician were to wish that nobody needed his skill’ (Ennead VI.8 [39].5,13-21, after Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10.1178b7-22). ‘Moral’ action and ‘moral virtue’ are only echoes or reflections or sad imitations of the life of God, which is always more than moral. We should be aiming to return to our dear homeland – but this is not a journey for the feet (nor do we need an astral chariot). Instead we need to wake another way of seeing  (Ennead I.6 [1].8, 16-28).
Did Plotinus suppose that we could do this ‘by ourselves’, that we could avoid a further fall into temptation, that we could climb back up, by our own will and reason, to the Divine we’ve lost? Was he guilty of the charge that Cudworth offered against the proud? ‘The way to obtain a good assurance indeed of our title to heaven, is not to clamber up to it, by a ladder of our own ungrounded perswasions; but to dig as low as hell by humility and self-denyall in our own hearts’ (Patrides 1980, 94). Similarly Henry More: ‘to be always bent down to the desire of the body and worldly delights, that motion is Bestial: To be always reaching at high things, that’s Diabolical: To be disengag’d from a man’s self, and stand indifferent to what ere the Will of God is, that’s Angelical or Divine’ (Patrides 1980, 207). It is at least true that Plotinus rebuked those who imagined themselves superior to the heavens (Ennead II.9 [33].9, 53-64), and that Porphyry records the help that he himself received ‘when he was going on a crooked course’ (Life 23.18-21). Whether this was a sign that he acknowledged his own frailty we cannot clearly tell (but may reasonably guess that he did). Porphyry also remarks – in a passage that has been widely misinterpreted – that he disdained to go on a temple-crawl with one of his other followers, Amelius (Life 10.34-41). Surely, it has been said, this proves that he cared nothing for the gods or for ritual observances? The actual background to his recorded aphorism (that it was for the gods to come to him, not he to them) is more likely to be Platonic: we should wait for the gods to act in us, not pester them (and especially not by rituals in which they can have little interest). We cannot expect to turn ourselves around – rather we must hope to be grasped, as it were, by the nape of the neck, and turned as Athena turned Achilles (Ennead VI.5 [23].7, 9f, after Homer Iliad I.197f). We may ready ourselves for intervention, may close our earthly eyes and rely instead on a faculty ‘that everyone has and few use’, and pray that the god will come – which Plotinus promises us He will, but not by magical compulsion. Each of us, he suggests, has an attendant daimon to oversee and guide us, and each of us may in turn be such a daimon too, as we or our souls migrate from life to life. We may even appeal to the star-gods for assistance, or turn out ourselves to be such gods. But it is true that in the end there is nothing between us and the One: it is the One in whom and by whom and alongside whom we live, and we do well only when we keep our eyes on the leader of our dance (Ennead VI.9 [9].8.34-45). That ‘leader’, by the way, is not – as Hilary Armstrong translated the passage in question – a conductor, but the ever-present leader of the chorus line, or perhaps the musician seated in the centre, ‘Phoebus of the thick hair, singing in the midst of [us]’ (Life 22.22). There is in each of us a part of the soul that has not fallen, the self we were and are in heaven, but its being lies, precisely, in its not considering itself supreme. Julian of Norwich expressed a similar point, that there is something in us that has never consented to sin (Julian 1998, 93: $37).
Without the One, there is nothing. Without the Divine Intellect in whom all realities have their place and being, there is only darkness. Does the One care for us at all, or the Divine Intellect have us in mind? To this there is no easy answer, since all words fail in respect of the One, as Plotinus knew as well as Dionysius the supposed Areopagite – except to note again that although the One indeed has no need of anything we contribute and is in no way improved by our service, its nature is generosity. The One is Love, not of the ‘indigent’ sort that is our own experience, but a love in eternal enjoyment of its own undivided love. Indeed there is even a Trinitarian account of it, though this is really no more than a manner of speaking: God is lover and beloved and the love itself between (Ennead VI.8 [39].15).​[7]​ That Love spills over into creation – not by compulsion, as though the One were subject to any law not of its own making. All things reflect that unity and beauty back to it, and we are called – not compelled – to do so too. We do so most successfully when we enjoy that love, not when we reason about it. And even our most exact reasonings depend upon revelations, whether personal or collective: without such axioms we can travel nowhere. Theresa and John of the Cross were a lot closer to Plotinus’s intention than Patrides could allow – and not as distant from the Cambridge Platonists themselves.
Possibly Real Contrasts
Are there still real contrasts to be drawn between the Cambridge Platonists – or Christian Platonists more generally - and the pagan Platonists, whether these latter were of Iamblichus’s mind or Porphyry’s? Iamblichus trusted more than Porphyry in the proper, god-given, theurgic rituals (or sacraments), and rejected Plotinus’s suggestion that there was some part of our own soul that never fell. Iamblichus, in short, suspected that someone – like Porphyry – could suppose that we could indeed return home by ourselves (as I suggest Plotinus did not think). Porphyry, conversely, was more distrustful than Iamblichus of the nature and motivation of the daimones that surrounded us. Not all spirits wish us well, and those that don’t are attracted by blood sacrifice and sensual music. Those latter at least arouse unworthy spirits in us, whether or not they have a real and separate being (see Porphyry 2000, 73). These are familiar arguments even within a Christian tradition. The one obvious distinction between the Christian and the pagan was, as Augustine noticed, that nothing in the pagan literature suggested that the Word was ever incarnate – or rather, that the eternal Word, the Divine Intellect, could ever be strictly identical with one only human being  (Augustine Confessions 7.9.13-14). That Word could be present in many – this was an obvious thought endorsed by Stoics as well as pagan Platonists. But this account was generally reckoned heretical in the mainstream Christian churches – the easier option that made Jesus only one of many sages. What was it that the pagan philosophers found to object about the Christian doctrine? Porphyry, it is clear, made his disapproval explicit, whether in a treatise Against the Christians or in several writings simply against the Christians. It is commonly now claimed that they thought it impossible that the Divine could be associated with bodies, with the merely material: a thought that Augustine argued was plainly inconsistent with their approval of the Divine’s embodiment, exactly, in this whole material world. If the material cosmos was an embodied God then God and Matter could after all coincide. 
You (sc. Porphyry) who say that all body must be avoided, kill the universe! You are saying that I should escape from my flesh: let your Jupiter [taking Jupiter here to be the World Soul] escape from heaven and earth! (Augustine Sermon 241.7; see O’Daly 1987, 67)
That World, for most pagans, was an eternal reality, rather than having – as Augustine and most other Christians have supposed – a temporal beginning​[8]​. Plotinus himself imagined – it is a familiar trope – how Zeus would appear incarnate: namely, like the statue of Olympian Zeus that Pheidias created (Ennead V.8 [31].1) ​[9]​. But he had another image far more ready to hand: namely the cosmos itself. Zeus is incarnate in the cosmos, being – in his allegorized mythology – the Soul that proceeds from the Intellect (and from the One). There is a distinction to be drawn between Soul-as-such and the World Soul, but it seems a distinction rather like that between Heracles himself and Heracles’ shadow-soul (Ennead IV.3 [27].27, 7-14; IV.3 [27].32, 24-28; IV.4 [28].1, I.1 [53].12, 32-40, after Homer Odyssey 11.601-2) ​[10]​,  save that the World Soul is a worthier partner of Soul-as-such than the mortal Heracles. What is missing, perhaps, is the thought that God did not merely agree to be incarnate, but that He agreed to suffer on our behalf. 
When Justinian issued an edict in 543 AD against the ‘errors of Origen’, he blamed them on the pagan Platonic tradition that Plotinus also shared (see Sherwood 1955, 77-81). Christians were not to agree that our souls were pre-existent, descending into bodies as a punishment, nor that they might have several incarnations. They were not to agree that the stars themselves were living, nor that our resurrection bodies were ball-shaped (that is to say, that we could expect to rise as stars). It was important to believe that our present selves, our souls and bodies, were the ones that Christ came to save, and important not to suggest, as Origen perhaps did, that our rise and fall were cyclical, that even the redeemed might fall away again. There is little or no value in characterizing either these opinions or their contraries as essentially ‘Western’, but it may be that they mark a real distinction between the pagan and the Christian​[11]​. Whether Plotinus would have been in complete agreement with Origen on these matters is uncertain: he did indeed suppose that the stars were living (and our superiors), that as souls we ‘pre-existed’ our present composite natures, and maybe even that our better or risen selves were or would be stars. But precisely because the fall into separate, material being is not an historical event, our ‘pre-existence’ may not be as far from the Christian version as it seems. And our ‘return’, he thinks, will be (and is) eternal. 
The distinction between pagan thought and Christian that pagan critics most often emphasised was between those willing to rely on ‘Reason’ and those who preferred ‘Faith’. Patrides, remember, insisted that in this the Cambridge Platonists were on the side of ‘Reason’, far removed from Tertullian’s ‘odd resolution, certum est quia impossibile’ (1980, 10-11), despite occasionally giving in to ‘superstitions’ about witches, sorcery and devils. This too is a familiar misreading, even a misquotation – of Tertullian. The argument he deployed, credibile est, quia ineptum est, was familiar in the courts: simply, if a strange story is told – for example as an alibi – when an easily credible one would be available, and unchallenged, there is good reason to believe the story precisely because it is, unnecessarily, strange (Moffat 1915-16; see also Sider 1980). Tertullian was not advocating an arbitrary credulity, and neither were any Christian apologists. Their creed might not be logically inescapable, but still be the necessary ground of sanity – as Henry More explained in his ‘Antidote against Atheism’ (1653):
It is possible that Mathematical evidence it self, may be but a constant undiscoverable delusion, which our nature is necessarily and perpetually obnoxious to, and that either fatally or fortuitously there has been in the world time out of mind such a Being as we call Man, whose essential property is to be then most of all mistaken, when he conceives a thing most evidently true. And why may not this be as well as anything else, if you will have all things fatall or casuall without a God? For there can be no curbe to this wild conceipt, but by the supposing that we our selves exist from some higher Principle that is absolutely good and wise, which is all one as to acknowledge that there is a God (Patrides 1980, 214).
Plotinus himself argues similarly to the notion that the Intellect contains rather than simply ‘representing’ all realities – or else God Himself would have no argument against a universal doubt (Ennead V.5 32].1, 20-65).
Pagan philosophers in general did not deny that our initial choice of philosophical method, teacher or fundamental principles was not the only rationally possible choice: there were after all many distinct philosophical schools, each with their own notions about life, the world and everything​[12]​. More than one of them may even be, in More’s sense, ‘sane’. Lucian mildly mocked the notion that we might be guided in that choice, but most philosophers could agree that at least we needed some assistance. How we could expect such assistance, or ever really deserve it, might be moot. The expectation that we might rise, or might be lifted, through the celestial spheres and realize the eternal presence of the One, did not imply that this would be easy. Nor did their conviction, shared by many later Christian thinkers​[13]​, that ‘Reason’, even human reason, was a reflection of the Divine, imply that all our reasonings are equally reliable. Original Sin – our wish to have things all our own way (Ennead V.1 [10].1) - dictates our situation, and weakens our eye for truth – but if we were wholly corrupt we would not have noticed. Our initial, sane, conviction may or may not be rightly considered as ‘a leap of faith’. Once we have reached a reasonable, even a strictly ‘rational’ conclusion, we shall certainly need to be faithful, or else be vulnerable to changes of mood and feeling. Like the statues of Daedalus our mere opinions are liable to run away from us unless they are fastened down (Plato Meno 97e-98a; see also Euthyphro 11c, where it is Socrates himself who sets them moving). ‘When a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow’ (Plato Phaedo 90b). To keep faith is to keep to an agreement or to a conclusion that we have made ‘in good faith’ and for good reason: to do so requires that we override what may seem later to be ‘rational’, and to carry on repeating the arguments that once convinced us even if they momentarily seem lame.
A difference very often alleged by Christians between pagan and Christian Platonism – or even between ‘Platonism’ as such and the Christian Gospel – is that for pagans ‘the World’ is an inevitable, and eternal, ‘emanation’ of the One whereas Christians (and other Abrahamists) rather insist that ‘the World’ was created ‘out of nothing’ by God’s own undetermined will. For the former, it is alleged, there could be no other World than this; for the latter, this World here is merely chosen for God’s own purposes. It seems to follow that pagans might hope to reason their way to an understanding of the whole while Christians recognize that God could have made things work in unknowably many ways, and that we can only discover which way is actual by careful attention to experience. In practice, of course, we cannot expect either to reason our way to complete understanding from a priori principles or to discern, merely from experience, what it is that is happening here-now and will – we presume - continue. Nor is it obvious that Plotinus and the Christians were at odds: in claiming that the Logos is ‘begotten and not made’ Christians seem to be saying very much what Plotinus also said, that the intelligible principles embodied in the material or phenomenal universe must be co-eternal in the divine Intellect. 
It is already clear that the thought of a horse existed if [God] wanted to make a horse; so that it is not possible for him to think it in order to make it, but the horse which did not come into being must exist before that which was to be afterwards (Ennead VI.7 [38].8, 6-9). 
The patterns according to which sensible and material reality are modelled, in other words, are themselves ‘begotten and not made’. The point is also at the root of orthodox Christian insistence that the Word of God is not a created thing: ‘He is external to the things which have come to be by will, but rather is Himself the Living Counsel of the Father, by which all these things have come to be’.​[14]​ The Divine Intellect, the Logos, contains all possible forms as eternal realities: ‘it lived not as one soul but as all, and as possessing more power to make all the individual souls, and it was the “complete living being”, not having only man in it: for otherwise there would only be man down here’ (Ennead VI.7 [38].8, 29-32).
The One is not forced to ‘emanate’, nor God the Father to create, but in both cases the divine is revealed in its generous sharing of the gift of being, and its welcome to all those of its creation that ‘return’ to it. Nor is the frequent claim that Plotinus expected ‘union’ with the One (whereas Christians recognized an insuperable gap between divine and created being, and a continued ‘separate’ existence for all redeemed individuals) convincing. If we are to ‘bring the divine in us back to the divine in the all’ (Porphyry, Life 2.26-7) it does not follow that we shall then ‘be’ the One, but only that we shall recognize an eternal presence. The notion that ‘the mystical union of Plotinus’ is replaced by ‘the union of love’ in the community of the Church (as McGinn [1992, 248] suggests) is clearly mistaken: the Delphic Oracle and Porphyry conclude their account of Plotinus’s life with the expectation that he has joined those who ‘set the dance of immortal love’ (Life 23.36f, after 22.54ff).  ‘There the most blessed spirits have their birth and live a life filled full of festivity and joy; and this life lasts for ever, made blessed by the gods.’ 
Could a Plotinian, pagan Platonism have developed into as many sects and separate heresies as the Christian revelation? Almost certainly it could (because it partly did). Could there have been a mainline somewhat like the Christian? Porphyry – it seems – rather hoped there would be, and prepared his Life of Plotinus not so much as a picture of a pagan saint but of a pagan Christ (Edwards 2000). Another such rival, Apollonius of Tyana, was also once available. So also was Heracles – a reputed son of God and eventual Olympian who spent his mortal life defeating monsters, even in his cradle​[15]​. He was deprived of the kingship that was his due, and died through the treachery or error of a friend. Admittedly, he was not, pace Prodicus​[16]​, in all respects a good moral example: as Origen caustically remarked against Celsus:
Let him show whether a man was worthy of divine honour who took the ox of a farmer by force like a thief, and feasted on it, delighting in the curses which the farmer swore at him while he was eating, so that even to this day the daemon of Heracles is said to receive the sacrifice with certain curses (Origen 1953, 440 (7.54)).
That the Christian Churches survived may be by God’s own grace – but this is not incompatible with there also being clear material causes. Pagan Platonism, even in the theurgical, ritual mode that Iamblichus and the Emperor Julian preferred, was a religion for the educated classes, and mostly for the rich. Plotinus wished us to feel affection for all creatures, and to care for them. He also – like most pagan philosophers – disparaged worldly wealth and reputation. But it seems that it was the Churches that better derived the moral – that we serve God by serving all His people. It is not the sage – nor in modern terms the physicist – that best knows the Mind of God, but the simple. Where the Cambridge Platonists stood in this, I do not know, nor even whether they all stood in the same place. Where Plotinus stood, or stands, we can only hope. He has, so Porphyry assured us, joined the dance of immortal love.
Deification
But what does that amount to? Another and yet more significant set of errors in Patrides’ commentary, of a different sort, is in a judgement about the doctrine of deification:
‘The deification of man is one of the most thoroughly Greek ideas espoused by the Cambridge Platonists. Its infrequent appearances in the West never managed to overcome the opposition of St Augustine, and it was in time stamped to death by Calvin’ (Patrides 1980, 19).
The errors here lie not in misattributing a doctrine to Plotinus, or to the Cambridge Platonists, but in identifying it both as a ‘thoroughly Greek idea’ and as obviously mistaken. That it is not ‘thoroughly Greek’ is easy enough to establish: it is, on the contrary, routinely denied in traditional Greek thought and asserted as a radical goal or possibility – by Plato (Theaetetus 176b), Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 10.1177b30-5), Stoics and Neoplatonists - in conscious rejection of mainstream Greek tradition. Nor does the notion appear infrequently even in the later West, let alone in the Orthodox East (see Russell 2005; Maddox 1990). Nor was it opposed by St Augustine, and manifestly was not done to death by Calvin. Quite what it means, as a doctrine, requires a little more comment.
The passages to which Cudworth, for example, applies for the notion of ‘deification’ are not the pagan texts, but the patristic: ‘The Gospel is nothing else, but God descending into the World in Our Form , and conversing with us in our likeness; that he might allure, and draw us up to God and make us partakers of his Divine Form. Theos gegonen Anthropos (as Athanasius speaks) hina hemas en heautoi theopoiesei, God was therefore incarnated and made man, that he might Deifie us, that is (as S.Peter expresseth it) make us partakers of the Divine nature’ (Patrides 1980, 101: after Athanasius De Incarnatione 54, and 2 Peter 1.4). Was the godliness that patristic authors meant very different from the pagan? What is it to become a god? The route to becoming gods, or at the very least godly, is not – as too much present-day fiction might suggest – by acquiring special powers or even special authority, but through the practice of virtue: a gradual disentangling of oneself from sensual attachments, self-serving fantasies and parochial impressions. On that point pagan and patristic writers were agreed, as were the Cambridge Platonists:  ‘without purity and virtue God is nothing but an empty name’ (Patrides 1980, 98, citing Ennead II.9 [33].15). Where they might disagree is in considering how possible this could be for us. Christians, like the Cambridge Platonists, might suggest instead that the god could take up residence in us, and that there was no other escape from sin. This is the distinction I briefly addressed before, that pagans partly expected to escape from sin and error by their own efforts, and that Christians doubted our capacity. The distinction is less certain, as I suggested, than is commonly supposed. But is there a distinction at any rate in the precise result? 
When Plato and Aristotle elevated the life of ‘theoria’ above any merely ‘practical’ or ‘political’ concerns they might be supposed to be praising the life of an independent scholar or philosopher – but this is not a likely story. Our goal must be ‘to love and serve the Lord’, ton theon theorein kai therapeuein (Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 8.1249b20), and the god we are to serve is himself theoria, the eternal enjoyment of eternal beauty (Aristotle Metaphysics 12.1072b18ff). This is at once both like and rather unlike the Christian hope, for it turns on our forgetting all transient and merely local things: our true and abiding self lives like the stars, leaving all mortal memories behind – as Heracles himself lives with the gods, and his shadow roams the Underworld (Ennead I.1 [53].12; see also IV.3 [27].32; after Homer Odyssey 11.601-2). Living forever with our memories is one way of describing Hell. Christians hoped instead to be raised to life immortal, to find our lives here redeemed in God’s compassion: how this should be is another and much longer story that even the Cambridge Platonists do not seem to have attempted.
Leaving aside that problem, what can we say of the relation between our present life and God’s? Is there indeed ‘a god’ in each of us, waiting to be awakened or released from all distractions? So Plotinus might expect: it was common knowledge, he suggested, that there was indeed such a god (Ennead VI.5 [23].1, 2-4; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 7.1153b32, ‘everything has something divine in it’), and that we might begin to see with the god’s own way of seeing. ‘Shut your eyes, and change to and wake another way of seeing, which everyone has but few use’ (Ennead I.6 [1].8, 26-8). A little unexpectedly perhaps, Plotinus leaves it open that this god, though one and the same in a way, is variously represented in each of us, by our own eternal spirit (distinct from other such spirits): the daimon that Xenocrates declared would alone make us eudaimon (Xenocrates: Aristotle Topics 112a37f; see also Eudemian Ethics 1247a27f; Plato Timaeus 90). We are all double: one of us is the soul-body composite that needs an appropriate discipline (Ennead VI.4 [22].14) ​[17]​, and the other is – as Carl Jung put it – ‘the imperishable stone’​[18]​. There are, so pagans might suppose, indefinitely many levels of divine or daimonic being, but all were united in the divine.
Even before this coming to be we were there, men who were different, and some of us even gods, pure souls and intellect united with the whole of reality; we were parts of the intelligible, not marked off or cut off but belonging to the whole; and we are not cut off even now (Ennead VI.4 [22].14, 18ff).
Our fall into the world of our present experience, so Plotinus goes on to say, involved ‘another man, wishing to exist’ who came to wind himself around us. Often, and perhaps almost always, we speak and feel along with that other man, the composite, but it is still possible to remember our original real nature. Maybe the god didn’t really ‘fall’, but came along to help.
He himself is the god who comes Thence, and his own real nature, if he becomes what he was when he came, is There. When he came here he took up his dwelling with someone else, whom he will make like himself to the best of the powers of his real nature, so that if possible this someone else will be free from disturbance or will do nothing of which his master does not approve (Ennead I.2 [19].6, 8-12).
Plotinus encourages his followers to identify with that eternal god – and perhaps it makes little difference whether there are many such cooperative gods or only one – and not with the composite empirical self that we ordinarily feel ourselves to be. ‘Nous is King, but we too are kings when we are in accord with it’ (Ennead V.3 [49].4.1-2). Paul on the other hand is confident that there is one and one only ‘spirit’ (namely Christ) to help us all, and that He remains, oddly, other than ourselves while also being the sole agent and enabler of our new lives: ‘I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me’ (Paul Galatians 2.20). Paul is the one wrapped round the Christ; Plotinus hopes that he is himself the god, or at least the daimon, round which the more usual self is wrapped. In either case the devotee’s effort is to see and live with the god’s life, and so retrieve or acquire or manifest the god. Plotinus, most likely, hoped to have abandoned his old life – as he had already disowned his childhood. The Cambridge Platonists hoped rather that their lives would be, had already been, redeemed. But perhaps even this distinction may be moot. Plotinus’s instruction – aphele panta, give it all away (Ennead V.3 [49].17, 39) ​[19]​ – is no more nihilistic in effect than the Christian command to forgive or to realign our vision. Give up our solitary lives so as to win them back, with company  (Mark 10.29; Matthew 19.29; Luke 18.29).
If one likens [reality] to a living richly varied sphere, or imagines it as a thing all faces, shining with living faces, or as all the pure souls running together into the same place, with no deficiencies but having all that is their own, and universal Intellect seated on their summits so that the region is illuminated by intellectual light - if one imagined it like this one would be seeing it somehow as one sees another from outside; but one must become that, and make oneself the contemplation. But we should not remain always in that manifold beauty, but go on still darting upwards, leaving even this behind (Ennead VI.7 [38].15, 25 – 16, 3).
So in conclusion: in his efforts to free the Cambridge Platonists of the charge of pagan recidivism Patrides identified several areas where they might be supposed to have differed from Plotinus. My argument has been that Plotinus has usually been misjudged and misinterpreted. Even such differences as really did exist between the pagan and the Christian forms – and it is clear that there were such differences – may turn out to be less significant than their agreement.
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^1	  Originally composed for a Cambridge Workshop on the Cambridge Platonists in 2013. I have profited from the comments especially of David Leech and Douglas Hedley.
^2	  In a more recent collection some similar suggestions are made to contrast Christian Platonism with Plato’s own intellectual elitism and Plotinus’s ‘disdain for the body’ (Taliaferro & Teply [2004, 6-7]). These suggestions are also suspect, but the collection as a whole is less tainted by such misreadings.
^3	  After Hunter 1950, 209-10, citing Joseph Glanvill The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), 43-4.
^4	  See also VI.1 [10]27, 20, where a more active Matter than usual, capable of becoming everything, is ‘like the dancer who in his dance makes himself everything’. All passages from Plotinus, unless otherwise identified, are drawn from Armstrong 1966-88, with acknowledgements to Harvard University Press.
^5	  Cf. Seneca Epistles 108.23 on the distinction between philosophy and philology.
^6	  For a better informed account of some genuine differences see Dockrill 2010.
^7	  Patrides (1969, 33n) was right to say that trying to equate the Christian Trinity with the ‘Platonical Triad’ of One, Nous and Soul ‘is bound to lead to heresy or at least to subordinationism’, but wrong to suggest that Cudworth’s reason was therefore ‘eclipsed’ when he sought a Plotinian analogue for the Trinity: the three hypostases are not where we should be looking for the comparison. There are other issues at stake than I can address here: Western Christianity has seemed to imply – as perhaps Plotinus does - that there is a unitary, as it were ‘impersonal’, substance behind or above the threefold Trinity, while the Eastern fiercely identifies the Father as the single personal source of both Word and Spirit (Ware 2015, 219-22). 
^8	  That is, the material or phenomenal world we experience had a beginning – but the world as it is conceived in the Divine Intellect does not: that is just as much an eternally real somewhat as the pagans thought, even before it is, as it were, released on its own recognizance so as to make its own way, our own way, back home. But that is another story.
^9	  See also Cicero Orator II.8-9; Dio Chrysostom, ‘Man’s First Conception of God’ (at Olympia, in 97 AD): 1939, vol.2, 57 (12.51).
^10	  See Pépin 1971; Sheppard 1980, 135. 
^11	  A belief in ‘reincarnation’, as Paul Williams (2002, 80-3) has pointed out (and converted away from Buddhism to Catholic Christianity when he realized it), makes our present self of less significance than the animating ‘soul’ that has been or may yet be ‘a boy and a girl, and a bush and a bird, and a dumb fish in the sea’ (after Empedocles B117DK). But this too is too large an issue to attempt here.
^12	  See Lucian ‘Hermotimus’: Lucian 2006, p.96: ‘There have been a lot of philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Antisthenes, your own school founders, Chrysippus and Zeno, and all the others. So, what persuaded you [Hermotimus] to ignore the others and to decide to choose the creed you did to guide your studies? Did Pythian Apollo treat you like Chaerephon, and send you to the Stoics as the best of all? His practice is to direct different people to different philosophies, as he knows each individual’s requirements’. Lucian’s answer to the epistemological problem was simply to follow common opinion, without supposing that this ‘inherited conglomerate’ had any stronger claim to truth. It is only easier (and safer).
^13	  See, for example, Benedict XVI (2009): ‘the objective structure of the universe and the intellectual structure of the human being coincide; the subjective reason and the objectified reason in nature are identical. In the end it is “one” reason that links both and invites us to look to a unique creative Intelligence’: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/pont-messages/2009/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20091126_fisichella-telescopio_en.html (accessed 4th May 2016).
^14	  Athanasius Orations against the Arians 3.64, trs. John Henry Newman and Archibald Robertson:  Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4. Edds., Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Christian Literature Publishing Co.: Buffalo, NY, 1892), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/28163.htm: accessed 4th May 2016. 
^15	  See Ralph Cudworth ‘Sermon preached before the Houses of Parliament’ (1647): CP, p.106. Patrides comments on the trope presenting ‘our blessed Saviour as the true Hercules’. See also Waith 1962.
^16	  Prodicus of Ceos on the Choice of Heracles (between Vice and Virtue): Xenophon Memorabilia 2.1.21-34.
^17	  See also VI.4 [22].15, 23-40, where Plotinus compares our situation with that of an assembly besieged by a disorderly populace, and needing some ‘speech from a sensible man’ to calm them down. John Smith offers a similar account of the wicked as being thoroughly divided against themselves: CP, pp.172-3.
^18	  Jung 1967, 59: ‘it was strangely reassuring and calming to sit on my stone. Somehow it would free me of all my doubts. Whenever I thought that I was the stone, the conflict ceased. “The stone has no uncertainties, no urge to communicate, and is eternally the same for thousands of years,” I would think, “while I am only a passing phenomenon which bursts into all kinds of emotions, like a flame that flares up quickly and then goes out.” I was but the sum of my emotions, and the other in me was the timeless, imperishable stone’. 
^19	  Cf. Francis Quarles (Patrides [1969, 9-10]): ‘the best way to see day-light is to put out thy Candle’.
